The effects of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and European Union (EU) on trade are separately estimated using an empirical gravity model. Employing a panel approach with both time-varying country and dyadic fixed effects on a large span of data (across both countries and time), it is found that EMU and EU each significantly boosted exports. EMU expanded European trade by 40% for the original members, while the EU increased trade by almost 70%. Newer members have experienced even higher trade as a result of joining the EU, but more time is necessary to see the effects of their joining EMU.
Introduction
There has been considerable disagreement concerning the magnitude of the tradestimulating effect of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in Europe, or indeed of any currency union in which member countries use the same currency. In earlier work, Glick and Rose (2002) estimated how the amount of trade between two countries was affected by whether they were in a currency union. Using a gravity model specification, they explained bilateral trade as a function of the GDP income of the two countries in each pair, the distance between them, and a host of other variables that may facilitate trade, such as sharing a border, a common language, membership in a common regional trade agreement, or a similar colonial history. To this specification, they added a measure of whether or not two countries share a common currency or have a stable one-for-one interchange of their currencies. Using a panel of 200 countries from 1948 to 1997, before the establishment of the EMU, they found that bilateral trade approximately doubled as a pair of countries formed and halved when a currency union dissolved.
The relevance of this estimate for the EMU was questioned on the grounds that it largely reflects the experiences of less developing countries in multilateral currency unions or in "hub and spoke" relations with a large anchor country. In fact, influential papers, such as Micco et. al. (2003) , Bun and Klaassen (2007) , Baldwin and Taglioni (2007) , Baldwin et al. (2008) , and Berger and Nitsch (2008) have estimated that EMU improved trade on the order of 15% or less, much smaller than the estimates in Glick and Rose (2002) suggest. Glick and Rose (2016) extended their earlier analysis to include the effect of currency unions on international trade through 2013, a period which includes the introduction of the EMU, which began with 11 member countries in 1999 and has since expanded to 19 members. To account for the possibility that trade effects for EMU countries may differ from that for other currency unions, which typically involve a developing country, they distinguished between the trade effects of EMU and non-EMU currency union pairs. They also made use of advances in econometric methodology.
1 Their preferred methodology -a panel approach with both dyadic and time-varying exporter and importer fixed effects on a long broad data set -led them to conclude that the effect of EMU on intra-European trade was still substantive, on the order of 50%.
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Of course, European trade has been affected by other efforts to foster regional economic integration, notably the elimination of tariffs and quotas and implementation of free trade arrangements through membership in the European Union (EU), which preceded establishment of the EMU. Since EU membership is a prerequisite for joining EMU, it is reasonable to make efforts to disentangle the effects of integration through adoption of a common currency and through regional trade arrangements. In their earlier work Rose (2002, 2016) controlled for membership in regional trade arrangements through inclusion of an aggregated measure that captures the average effect of all regional trade agreements (RTAs). However, by aggregating all such arrangements together they do not allow for possible heterogeneity in the effects of different arrangements, such as the EU. This paper specifically distinguishes between the separate effects of EU and other RTAs so as to explicitly analyze how membership in EU affects the trade effects of EMU.
The paper also assesses the extent to which the effects of EMU and EU on trade flows differ between older and newer members. As shown in Table 1 The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the methodology and dataset.
Section 3 reports results for the effect of EMU and other currency unions on trade. Here, as in the earlier work of Rose (2002, 2016) , the analysis starts with a single aggregate indicator dummy that captures the average effect of RTAs on trade flows. Thereafter, the effects of the regional trade agreement variable are disaggregated, so as to separate out the effects of EU membership from those of other trade arrangements. The trade effects of old vs. new members of EMU and EU are also separately estimated EU. Section 4 concludes.
Methodology and Data Set
To measure the effect of currency unions on aggregate international trade, the analysis starts with estimation of a traditional gravity model of international trade:
5 Other papers seek to understand the trade effects of RTAs and more general trade arrangements such as the WTO (Rose, 2004; Subramanian and Wei, 2007; Eicher and Henn, 2011). where i and j denote countries, t denotes time, and
• Xijt denotes the real value of bilateral exports from i to j at time t,
• CU is unity if i and j use the same currency at time t and 0 otherwise,
• RTA is unity if i and j belong to the same regional trade arrangement at time t and 0 otherwise,
• β is a vector of coefficients,
• Z is a vector of controls,
• {δ} is a set of year-specific effects,
• εij represents the myriad other influences, assumed to be well behaved.
A standard collection of determinants from the gravity literature are used as (Z) controls:
the products of national real GDP and real GDP per capita, the distance between the countries, the product of national land masses, dummy variables for the number of landlocked and island countries in the dyad, and dummy variables if the countries share a common language, land border, and (variants of) colonial heritage. δ controls for the effects at time t that are common to all country pairs.
The coefficients of interest are γ and τ, which represent the partial trade impact of currency union and regional trade agreements, respectively. This specification ignores two related phenomena which may affect the impact of currency union and RTA on trade: (i) effects of these forms of integration between i and j on other countries through so-called "multilateral resistance" effects; and (ii) general equilibrium effects on spending and output for all countries (see Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003; Baier and Bergstrand, 2009; and Head and Mayer, 2014) .
To address these issues a second specification is estimated:
where
• {λit} is a complete set of time-varying exporter dummy variables, and
• {ψjt} is a complete set of time-varying importer dummy variables, Since {λit} , {ψjt} control for the effects which are specific to a country and all of its trading partners at time t, this equation holds constant all country-specific "monadic" phenomena rather than time-invariant dyadic phenomena. 6 Consequently, (2) can only estimate the effect of pairspecific phenomena, like the currency union and trade agreement effects on exports.
Neither of these specifications address the issue of omitted variables which is particularly relevant in light of the inherent challenge of including all relevant determinants of bilateral trading relationships. As emphasized by Baldwin and Taglioni (2007) and demonstrated Rose (2002, 2016) , controlling for unobserved factors by the inclusion of country-pair fixed effects has a significant effect on results. 7 This is shown to be the case in the analysis later.
The Data Set
A large data set is used in the analysis in order to obtain sufficient degrees of freedom necessary for inclusion of the many fixed effects required to control for unobservables. A large data set also allows direct comparison of the effects of individual currency unions and trade areas, such as the EMU and EU, with others.
The data set used is identical to that assembled by Glick and Rose (2016 As in Rose (2002,2016) , the currency union variable is defined as country pairs using the same money or where currencies are interchangeable between the two countries at a 
Estimation Results
The analysis begins with estimation of (1) with ordinary least squares, using standard errors robust to clustering (since dyads [country-pairs] are dependent across years).
Pooled panel
Pooled panel estimates for (1) are presented in the first two columns of In addition to the countries listed in Table 1 , the EU dummy also includes overseas French Departments.
13 Glick and Rose (2016) obtain similar results for the effects of EMU using the log of average trade, rather than exports, as the dependent report. However, they do not report the coefficients for RTAs or other gravity model variables.
As emphasized in Rose (2002, 2016) , it is important to account for all countrypair effects, whether observable or not, including potential endogeneity of currency unions. In addition, since within estimator relies only on time-series variation around pair means, it answers the policy question of interest, namely the (time series) question "What is the trade effect of a country joining (or leaving) a currency union?" For these reasons, estimates that include dyadic fixed effects are preferred.
14 Accordingly, (1) is re-estimated with the inclusion of (more than 28,000) dyadic fixed effects. The resulting (within) estimates are presented in the last two columns of Table 2 . These estimates rely only on time-series variation around dyadic means, and thus account for all country-pair effects, whether observable or not. Since such dyadic effects are very significant in both statistical and economic terms, the within estimates of Table 2 should be considered to be much more believable than those given in the first two columns of Table 2 .
The estimates in Table 2 indicate that the within estimate of γ is lower than the pooled effect without pair effects, falling from .90 to .61. However, when the EMU effect is split off, the effect for non-EMU currency unions rises to .71, while the EMU effect is now estimated to be large, positive, and significant, with a point estimate of .46 implying that EMU entry expands exports by (e .46 -1≈) 58%. 15 16 In addition, observe that including pair fixed effects also lowers 14 It should be noted that the analysis does not claim that currency unions are formed exogenously. Nor does it attempt to find instrumental variables to handle any potential endogeneity problem. The inclusion of pair effects provides an effort to handle this concern.
15 Glick and Rose (2016) , when using (log) trade, rather than exports, as the dependent variable, find an EMU coefficient of .41.
16 Glick and Rose (2016) report similar results and find that they are not affected if the non-EMU currency union "catch-all" variable is disaggregated into a number of separate currency unions, including the CFA franc zone; the East Caribbean Currency Union, and pairs in which both countries use the Australian $; the British pound; the French Franc (before the Euro was created); the Indian rupee; and the US $.
the effect of RTAs, from 1.0 to .37; the decline is comparable after separating out the EMU effect.
Results with country-year effects
How are the results affected by econometric concerns about multilateral resistance and other general equilibrium effects? As discussed above, these concerns are addressed by estimating specification (2) of the gravity equation, which includes time-varying country dummies, with robust standard errors. Table 3 shows the results.
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The estimate of γ presented in column (1) of Table 3 is economically and statistically significant. The point estimate of the currency union effect on exports is .51. This is a large effect in economic (e .
-1 ≈ 67%) and statistical terms (the t-ratio exceeds 20). Point estimates
for the other coefficients also seem intuitive in sign and size.
The analysis presented above suggests that EMU may have a different export effect than other currency unions. The effects of EMU are split off in model specification (2); the estimates are presented in col. (2) in Table 3 . Consistent with earlier results but even more dramatically, the export-stimulating effect of EMU is lower than other currency unions. While other currency unions now seem to raise exports significantly (e .76 -1 ≈ 114%, with a t-ratio of 38), the net effect of EMU on exports is negative; the point estimate is -.65 with a standard error of .03. This seems extremely implausible.
As reported in col. (3), adding country-pair fixed effects (to the time-varying exporter/importer effects) reduces the combined currency union effect somewhat, though it remains positive and significant. However, as shown in col. (4), the EMU effect on exports is now positive and economically significant (e .43 -1≈) 54% (with a t-ratio exceeding 20). Thus, the dyadic effects add considerable explanatory power to the exports equation while reversing the negative EMU effect. Indeed, the point estimate of the EMU effect on exports from Table 3 (with dyadic fixed effects as well as country-year effects), .43, is very similar to the effect (with pair fixed effects alone) from The preferred results in Table 4 with dyadic fixed effects deliver an EMU effect which is significantly positive in both the economic and statistical senses. This contrasts with the small and insignificant effects estimated, for example, by Baldwin and Taglioni (2007) and Baldwin et al. (2008) , who use a similar specification with country-year dummies and dyadic fixed effects. 20 Glick and Rose (2016) show that the main reason is the span of the data set across both countries and time. Their analysis as well as the estimates here use 879,794 observations over the period 1948-2013; Baldwin and co-authors work with a small sample of industrial countries, , and a much shorter time span, conventional for the EMU-focused literature. 
Disaggregating the RTA effect
The finding that currency unions in general and EMU in particular have significant trade effects accords with the results in Glick and Rose (2016) . However, the regional trade agreement variable included in their analysis as well in the estimation here thus far constrains the effects to be the same across individual RTAs. Table 4 shows what happens when heterogeneity is allowed across RTAs as well as CUs using different econometric specifications.
Focusing on the specifications with country pair fixed effects in col. (2) and (4) Several papers examine the effect of GATT/WTO membership on trade using gravity models (Rose, 2004; Subramanian and Wei, 2007; Eicher and Henn, 2011) . The latter particularly stress the importance of including pair fixed effects; doing so, they find that WTO has no significant effect on trade, while regional trade agreements do. 22 The effects of non-EU RTAs are themselves heterogeneous, but disaggregating non-EU RTAs does not affect the EU results on which the analysis focuses.
al. (2008) control for multilateral resistance effects in a sample of almost 100 countries over the period 1960-2000 and find that EU increased members' trade by 143%.
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However, separating out the effects of EU appears to come at a "cost" of significantly reducing the estimated export effects of EMU. Recall the preferred specification in col. (4) of 
Disaggregating old and new members
Is that the end of the story? No. EMU countries differ significantly in how long since they adopted the euro. In particular, 7 of the current 19 members of EMU only adopted the euro over time. In addition, these countries were generally much less integrated economically with the other older EMU members, particularly as they all joined the EU in 2004 or later.
To investigate this further, Table 5 reports results distinguishing between the EMU and EU effects for "old" (who joined pre-2004) and "new" (who joined in 2004 and later) members of the EMU. More specifically, it separates out the effects on trade among old country pairs ("Old-Old") and trade involving newer members both among themselves and with older members ("New"). Analogous measures are constructed for EU membership. The preferred specification given by (2) with both country-year and pair fixed effects is employed.
For comparison, the first column of Table 5 reproduces the results in Table 3 , separating out the effects of EMU and EU from other arrangements. Breaking out EMU entry by date of membership in col. (2) results in a considerable difference in the trade effect for older and newer members, with a large and very significant effect for the latter and a much smaller effect for the former. However, this result reverses upon allowing heterogeneity in the EU effect. As shown in col. (3), trade among the old members rises by (e .34 -1≈) 40%, while the effect for new countries is basically zero. The reason is that the trade effects of joining the EU are more than three times as big for the newer as for older members (τ= 1.36 vs. .52, implying 290% vs 68% greater exports). Evidently, imposing homogeneity on the effects of EU forces the data to wrongly attribute the effects of EU for the newer members to EMU. Allowing heterogeneity in the EU effect, reveals that EMU indeed has a strong export effect for the older members.
Summary and Conclusion
In their EER (2016) paper, using annual data that covers more than 200 countries between 1948 and 2013, Glick and Rose concluded that "our preferred methodology (a panel approach which includes country-pair fixed effects on the largest possible span of data across countries and time) leads to the conclusion that EMU has thus far boosted bilateral trade by around 50%."
In this earlier work membership in regional trade arrangements was controlled through inclusion of an aggregated measure that reflects the average effect of all regional trade agreements (RTAs). However, aggregating all such arrangements together does not allow for possible heterogeneity in the effects of different arrangements, such as the EU. This paper specifically distinguishes between the effects of EU and other RTAs so as to explicitly analyze how membership in EU affects the trade effects of EMU. The extent to which the effects of EMU and EU on trade flows differ between older and newer members is also assessed. As most of these newer members are transition economies that differed significantly from the original members in terms of their economic structure and development, there is reason to believe that the impact of EC and EMU entry might differ as well.
Indeed, breaking out EMU entry by date of membership shows there is considerable difference in the EMU trade effect for older and newer members, with a large and very significant effect for the former. The least squares panel results with time-varying country and dyadic fixed effects, which can be considered to be the most plausible econometric model, deliver large positive effects for the effect of EMU membership on exports of 40% for the older EMU members. More time is necessary to see the effects of the joining EMU for the newer members. It also found that there are independently significant effects of joining the EU, ranging from 70% for the older members to almost 300% for newer members. Regressand: log of bilateral exports. Intercept, year controls, product of national land masses, and dummy variables for the number of landlocked and island countries in the pair, not reported. 28,114 fixed dyadic (pairspecific) effects included in the col. 
